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Abstract 
This paper presents an empirical analysis of the determinants of research cooperation between 
firms and Public Research Organisations (PROs) for a sample of innovating small and medium-
sized enterprises. The econometric analysis is based on the results of the KNOW survey carried out 
in seven EU countries during 2000. In contrast to earlier works that provide information about the 
importance of PROs’ research, we know how many collaborative projects a firm has had with 
PROs. This allows us to study the determinants of firms’ collaboration with PROs in terms of both 
the propensity of a firm to cooperate with a university (do they cooperate or not) and the extent of 
this cooperation (the number of collaborations). Two questions are addressed. Which firms 
cooperated with PROs? And what are the firm characteristics that might explain the number of 
collaborations with PROs? The results of our analysis point to two major phenomena. First, the 
propensity to forge an agreement with an academic partner depends on the ‘absolute size’ of the 
industrial partner. Second the openness of firms to the external environment, as measured by their 
willingness to search, screen and signal, significantly affects the development of cooperations with 
PROs. Our findings suggest that acquiring knowledge through the screening of publications and 
involvement in public policies positively affects the probability of signing an agreement with a 
PRO, but not the level of collaboration developed. In fact, firms that outsource research and 
development (R&D), and patent to protect innovation and to signal competencies show higher 
levels of collaboration. 
 
 
Keywords: Public Research Organisations, University-Industry R&D cooperation, Openness. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Since the 1980s, many countries have implemented policies to promote and sustain university–
industry partnerships. In the light of this phenomenon, an increasing number of academic 
contributions have attempted to understand, explain, and justify these interactions in economic 
terms. In Europe, university–industry relationships have been analysed mainly from a qualitative 
point of view or by relying on case studies of single universities.1 Very few contributions have 
been supported by systematic data analysis. Some country-specific data have been gathered and 
analysed: Meyer-Krahmer and Schmoch (1998) and Beise and Stahl (1999) provide interesting 
evidence of the contribution of public research to industrial innovation in Germany. At the 
European level, apart from the PACE 2 (Policies, Appropriability and Competitiveness for 
European Enterprises) questionnaire and the three CIS (Community Innovation Surveys)3, there 
are few databases that facilitate analysis of the links between universities and firms taking into 
account firm, sector and country effects.  
 
The aim of this paper is to develop an original quantitative analysis of the determinants of firms' 
participation in research cooperation with public research organisations (PROs are defined here as 
universities and other public research centres). Our analysis provides preliminary evidence of the 
characteristics that affect firms’ involvement with PROs in R&D projects, controlling for country 
and sector fixed effects. We use the results of the 2000 KNOW survey covering seven EU countries, 
including the four largest. The survey was limited to five sectors: food and beverages, chemicals 
(excluding pharmaceuticals), communications equipment, telecommunications services and 
computer services, and focused on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) employing a 
minimum of 10 and a maximum of 999.  
 
The econometric estimations are based on direct measurement of the extent of the collaboration 
between firms and PROs. Unlike previous studies we have information on the number of R&D 
projects conducted jointly with PROs in the three years before the survey (1997-2000). This direct 
measure of university–industry interaction allows us to assess the factors that affect: (a) the 
probability of a firm developing a cooperation with a PRO; and (b) the number of collaborative 
projects developed by the firm in the previous three years. Specifically, we address two main 
questions. Which firms established cooperation with PROs during the three years before the 
                                                                 
1 See, among others, Faulkner and Senker (1995) for a qualitative technology-specific study. See Geuna et al. (2004), 
among others, for a university specific case (University Louis Pasteur, Strasbourg). 
2 See Arundel et al. (1995) and Arundel and Geuna (2004) for an analysis based on the PACE data, which focused on the 
large EU R&D intensive firms.  
3 See, among others, Mohnen and Hoareau (2003) for an analysis based on CIS II.  
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questionnaire? What are the particular characteristics that might explain the number of their 
agreements with PROs? 
 
Particular attention is devoted to the idea that the openness of the firm to the external environment 
has an important effect on the development of collaboration with PROs. Openness refers here to 
the broad set of activities that firms can conduct to acquire knowledge from, voluntarily disclose 
knowledge to and/or exchange knowledge with the external world. These activities include 
searching,  screening and signalling and can be carried out in different ways. It is important to 
account for these activities in order to understand whether their impact on both the propensity and 
the extent of collaboration is similar. In addition to openness we analysed the influence of other 
variables on firms’ collaborations with PROs. Among these control factors we tested for firm size, 
firms’ R&D activity and firms’ innovative activity. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature on university–industry 
R&D cooperation. Section 3 discuses the information collected in the KNOW survey and in-depth 
interviews relevant to the understanding of university–industry cooperation. The propensity for 
and extent of PRO-firm collaborations are examined in Section 4 using an econometric model. 
Finally, Section 5 summarises the main results of the analysis.  
 
2. University–industry collaboration 
The extensive literature on university–industry relationships is mainly empirical and based on case 
studies, patent and bibliometric analyses, or large surveys. One part of the literature highlights the 
positive impacts of scientific results on the economic sphere. Without academic research outcomes 
many innovations could not have been realised or would have come much later (Mansfield 1991; 
Beise and Stahl 1999). Scientific r esults brought about increased sales and higher research 
productivity and patenting activity for firms (Cohen et al. 1998). A second strand of the literature 
examines the relative importance of PROs, from the point of view of firms, as an external source of 
information both for new ideas and innovation completion. Cohen et al. (2002) and Fontana et al. 
(2004) show that although in both phases public research is less important than contributions from 
the vertical chain of production (suppliers, buyers, the firm itself), among the sources that are not 
in the production chain (competitors, consultants, joint ventures) the contribution of PROs is 
indeed significant. Other contributions study the importance of the channels used by both actors to 
exchange knowledge. Cohen et al. ( 2002) find that the channels of open science (publications, 
public meetings and conferences) are crucial. Other studies (Meyer-Krahmer and Schmoch 1998; 
Arundel and Geuna 2004) underline the importance of collaborative research and informal  
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contacts. Finally, a set of econometric models that highlights the characteristics of firms draws 
upon the results of the research carried out in PROs to innovate. Very few analyses based on large 
surveys focus on formal R&D cooperation. The aim of this  paper is to shed new light on the 
characteristics of firms involved in formal R&D cooperation with universities and other public 
research centres.  
 
The role of firm size in influencing the propensity of firms to collaborate with PROs is one of the 
basic t enets of the literature on university–industry relationships as acknowledged in recent 
empirical investigations (Mohnen and Hoareau 2003; Cohen et al. 2002; Arundel and Geuna 2004; 
Laursen and Salter 2004). Usually larger firms and start-ups have a higher probability of benefiting 
from academic research. 
 
Other studies (Schartinger  et al. 2001; Arundel and Geuna 2004) incorporate level of R&D 
expenditure or R&D intensity. Firms that invest heavily in R&D are likely to possess a high 
capacity to absorb the k nowledge developed outside the firm (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). If 
‘absorptive capacity’ has a major role we would expect that the higher the firm R&D intensity (or 
investment) the higher the probability will be of a relationship with a PRO being established and 
the greater will be the number of collaborative R&D projects. 
 
A recent study (Laursen and Salter 2004) introduces the concept of the ‘open’ search strategies of 
firms. In this study, the strategy regarding openness is a search strategy and the degree of firms’ 
openness depends on the number of external channels of information used to innovate.4 Firms that 
are ‘more open’ have a higher probability of considering the knowledge produced by universities 
as important for their innovation activities. 
 
The degree of openness of a firm may be looked at from a broader perspective and may be 
considered as the set of activities carried out by firms to import information from and to 
voluntarily disclose knowledge to the external world. To get access to external knowledge firms 
may implement a search strategy (Laursen and Salter, 2004) together with an in-depth screening 
activity. Screening entails the selection of particular sources to get precise information concerning a 
specific problem. Openness may also represent the willingness of firms to share information. 
Panagopoulos (2003) shows that firms that are willing to share their innovation (i.e. choose to have 
minimal intellectual property  protection) are more likely to form collaborations with universities. 
                                                                 
4 They use 15 different sources of information to construct the openness variable. The more firms use different external 
and internal sources, the more open they are.  
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Some firms may find it profitable to disclose knowledge and to inform the outside environment 
about their range of competencies by activating a  signalling  activity. Pénin (2004) provides 
empirical evidence that shows how firms often voluntarily reveal important pieces of knowledge 
through scientific publications, conferences, patents and the Internet. The main reasons for 
adopting such a strategy are to trigger reciprocity from other firms, gain feedbacks from suppliers 
and users, and to expand their network  and reputation, but also to improve higher order 
knowledge (i.e. to ensure that others know what you know). In short, by  signalling their 
competence firms attract potential partners and open up new opportunities for collaboration.  
 
We also recognise that cooperation may be influenced by the ‘legal status’ of the firm. It is 
generally accepted that R&D activities tend to be concentrated at the firm’s headquarters. 
However, empirical studies have generally failed to explicitly include this determinant among the 
independent variables – mainly because of lack of information on the location of the respondent 
with respect to the company headquarters. In a recent paper, Mohnen and Hoareau (2003) found 
that independent firms rely more on collaborations with PROs than firms that are part of large 
organisations. This result can probably be explained by the fact that within large organisations, the 
headquarters usually mediates collaboration. 
 
Typically firms can engage in product and/or process innovations (Klevorick et al. 1995). Although 
it is very likely that there is a link between the type of innovative activities carried out by firms 
and the propensity for and the extent of firms’ collaborations with PROs, recent investigations 
provide mixed results concerning the direction and the extent of the relationship. Mohnen and 
Hoareau (2003) found a positive relationship between the introduction of radical product 
innovations and the extent of reliance on PROs. Laursen and Salter (2004) found only partial 
support for the hypothesis that the more innovative firms in terms of product innovations are 
those that rely more on public sources. Swann (2002) maintains that companies involved in process 
innovation are more likely to cooperate with PROs than those engaged in product innovation. 
Though in this paper we focus mainly on the impact of openness on both the probability of a firm 
to develop research cooperation with a PRO and the number of research agreements developed, 
we also test for the influence of the other control variables. 
 
3. Firm—PRO Collaboration: Evidence from the KNOW survey and in-depth interviews 
The empirical analysis presented in this paper is based on the results of the KNOW survey and on 
70 in-depth interviews carried out in 2000. 
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3.1 The Know Survey 
In covering seven EU countries,5 including the four largest, the KNOW survey focused on five 
sectors: food and beverages (NACE 15), chemicals excluding pharmaceuticals (NACE 24 minus 
NACE 24.4), communications equipment (NACE 32), telecommunications services  (NACE 64.2), 
and computer services (NACE 72). These specific sectors were chosen to provide a range of low, 
medium and high technology manufacturing and to include two innovative service sectors. In each 
country, a random sample of firms from two size classes (10–249 employees and 250–999 
employees) within each of the five sectors was drawn from a national business registry. The 
response rates by country varied from a minimum of 9% in the UK to a maximum of 76% in 
Denmark. The average response rate was 25% and 33% not including the UK. Of the 675 firms that 
responded, 458  – all innovators  – were retained for the analysis (non-innovative firms were 
excluded).6  
 
Consistent with the findings from other surveys of firms’ innovative activity (Klevorick et al. 1995; 
Arundel  et al. 2000; Cohen  et al. 2002; Swann 2002), the firms included in our sample only 
infrequently rated PROs as the most important source of information (Fontana  et al., 2004). 
However, about half of them had had some R&D cooperation with PROs in the three years before 
the questionnaire. Of the 458 firms, 222 said they had been involved in one or more cooperative 
agreements with PROs in the previous three years.  
 
Participation in cooperative projects varied depending on which industry the firms belonged to. 
Food and beverages and chemicals are the industries with the largest share of firms collaborating 
with PROs while telecommunication services is the industry least involved with PROs. A relatively 
large number of computer services firms never cooperate with PROs, although some have 
developed a significant number of cooperative R&D projects with PROs (more than six in the last 
three years).7 Table 1 shows the subdivision of the number of collaborative agreements by sectors.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Overall, the firms surveyed have an average of 1.6 R&D cooperative projects with PROs. They 
collaborate with PROs from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 25 times and the distribution of 
                                                                 
5 The countries are: Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK. 
6 See Caloghirou, Constantelou and Vonortas (2004) for the description of the KNOW survey’s methodology and main 
results.  
7 The highest reported number of R&D projects with PROs was 25. Two respondents answered 80 and two responded 
100. They were excluded from the analysis because we considered their answer was either incorrect or that the numbers 
included informal contacts.  
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their cooperation is very skewed (see Table 2 in the Appendix for the descriptive statistics). The 
population of firms carrying out collaborative projects with PROs can be described as being 
composed of a large number of organisations cooperating in only a small way and a small group of 
firms involved in a large number of cooperative agreements.  
 
3.2 In-depth interviews 
In each of the seven EU countries the KNOW team members interviewed one small and one large 
firm in each of the five selected sector – a total of 10 in-depth interviews in each country. We 
selected companies that replied to the questionnaire and the objective of the interview was to gain 
further knowledge on the means used by firms to gather external information (i.e. their screening 
and search strategies) and their cooperative behaviour (in general and with PROs). In this section 
we highlight those results from the interviews that are relevant to the understanding of university-
industry collaboration.  
 
Within groups, the division interviewed often underlined that the parent company was involved 
in the innovation process. The parent company either developed the innovation or was involved in 
the first stages of the R&D process (alone or in collaboration with external partners). The firm's 
policy was determined by the strategy of the parent company. A centralised R&D policy implied 
higher involvement of the parent company in terms of cooperation, competitive intelligence and 
patenting activities. However, in some cases firms were independent and were free to conduct 
research with their own network of partners. This information indicates that the status of the firm 
influences its innovative and thus cooperative behaviour, but headquarters are more likely to 
conclude cooperative agreements and to apply for patents.  
 
A significant number (around 50%) of the companies interviewed collaborated with universities or 
PROs. These firms generally developed intense competitive intelligence activities and they 
regarded these activities as being strategic. They used a variety of tools to search for information 
about the external environment: they subscribed to professional and scientific journals, attended 
trade fairs and conference, used the Internet and deepened contacts with suppliers and clients. 
Some used reverse engineering and patent databases, although these particular tools were used 
less often. Firms that never cooperated with PROs also undertook search activities. In this sense 
then, searching behaviour was not a discriminating factor. Some of the interviews clearly 
highlighted that those firms that were not open to the external world or that only activated search 
tools occasionally never collaborated with third parties to innovate.  
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Among the reasons for not collaborating with universities, firms cited discrepancies between the 
objectives of the two parties, the length of time involved in university research,  the different focus 
and hence different research questions addressed by universities and firms, cultural differences, 
and uneasiness with ‘open science’ disclosure procedures. Moreover, in some sectors it was 
considered that universities are lagging behind industry, in the sense that most graduate students 
tend to ignore recent industry developments. 
 
Among the portfolio of formal agreements signed with universities, the interviewees often 
mentioned cooperative projects within a government research programme (which was in part 
subsidising the R&D cooperation). Respondents considered government research programmes to 
be a useful way to facilitate knowledge flows between different organisations. Clearly, the 
financial aspects were an important motivation for firms to collaborate with PROs, even if the 
bureaucracy was judged to be excessive. Generally, firms become involved in government-
subsidised R&D agreements as a means to solve a specific technical problem.  
 
Firms usually selected academic partners based on reputation and domains of competence. 
University partners were considered important  for the innovation process because they were able 
to solve very specific problems and transfer important scientific and technical knowledge. Some 
respondents underlined that collaborating with universities increased their reputation and some 
clients saw gains in terms of reliability and innovative ability.  
 
Finally, our interviews revealed that the role of universities differed between sectors. In chemicals, 
collaboration with universities mainly helps to reduce costs and risks and allows firms to acquire 
and update scientific knowledge in order to finalise products. In the agro-industry universities 
help firms to meet government regulations, especially in testing activities in bacteriology. In the 
computer services sector, however, the main role of universities is to help firms update and 
acquire technical knowledge. 
 
4. Modelling PRO-firm collaboration  
Direct measurement  of the extent of collaboration between firms and PROs is unique to the 
KNOW survey. In contrast to earlier work that produced information about the importance of PRO 
research, here we know how many R&D projects were conducted within a firm–PRO partnership. 
This allows us to study the determinants of firms’ collaboration with PROs in terms of both the 
propensity for a firm to cooperate with a university (do they cooperate or not) and the extent of 
this cooperation (the number of R&D projects). Two questions are addressed in this section. Which  
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firms initiated collaboration with PROs during the three years before the questionnaire?What are 
the characteristics that might explain the number of R&D projects with PROs? In Section 4.1 we 
present the econometric models and Section 4.2 describes the explanatory variables included in the 
estimations. In Section 4.3 we estimate the models. 
 
4.1 The econometric model  
The number of collaborative projects is the measure we use for the extent of collaboration between 
firms and PROs, and our dependent variable. Being a discrete variable, it appropriate for the 
estimation to employ a model for count data based on a Poisson distribution. In this case, we 
would define yi as the number of R&D collaborations firm i has been engaged in (where i = 1, 2, …, 









i l l -
= =                    (1) 
 
where  li can be specified by a vector of covariates  Xi that includes the variables that will be 
introduced in Section 4.2. The most common formulation for li is the log linear model: 
 
i i i x b l = ln                       (2) 
 
which guarantees that the expected number of collaborations is non negative and is given by: 
 
( ) i ix
i i i e x y E b l = =                     (3). 
 
There are two issues that arise when using Poisson models. The first concerns the fact that a 
Poisson distribution constrains the variance to be equal to the sample mean. This is a problem in 
our case given that the sample is very skewed. The second issue concerns the presence of the large 
number of firms in our sample with zero collaborations. Although many firms have engaged in 
R&D collaboration with PROs only a few have collaborated in projects. Both these features make 
the Poisson model unsuitable for modelling the level of participation of firms in collaborations 
with PROs. 
 
One way to deal with the overdispersion issue is to add a random unobserved effect to the mean of 
the Poisson distribution. This solution was first proposed by Hausman et al. (1984) and taken up by  
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others in several analyses based on innovation and patent counts (Silverberg and Verspagen, 2003; 
Nesta and Saviotti, 2004). It involves the use of a modified Poisson such as: 
 





i i i y
u e
u y Y P
i l
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= =                     (4). 
 
In our case ui accounts for unobserved cross-sectional heterogeneity among firms not adequately 
accounted for by the chosen covariates. If ui is distributed as a Gamma, then the unconditional 
distribution for yi that can be obtained is a mixture of Poisson and Gamma distribution (Cameron 
and Trivedi, 1998):  
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i r . Equation (5) is the form of the Negative Binomial distribution with mean li 
and variance li (1+ ali ) for a > 0. This equation constitutes the starting point of our estimations.  
 
The issue of ‘excess zero’ will be dealt with by employing a Zero Inflated Negative Binomial 
(ZINB) model. Our dependent variable describes the number of collaborations between firms and 
PROs. However, the actual number is observable only if a firm decides to collaborate with PROs. 
There is a substantial ‘qualitative’ difference between a decision to increase the number of projects 
from 0 to 1 and from 1 to 2 or 3 etc. The former decision reflects the propensity of the firm to 
collaborate. The latter captures the extent to which the firm is engaged in R&D collaborations. 
ZINB models capture both these aspects by estimating a combined qualitative regression that 
explains the decision not to collaborate, and therefore acts as ‘selection model’, and a quantitative 
regression that explains the extent of collaboration for those firms that collaborate. Moreover, it 
must be noted that our dependent variable refers to the number of collaborations established in the 
three years preceding the survey. A bigger window would probably have produced a less skewed 
distribution since firms that record 0 projects  may have recorded engagement in R&D projects 
with PROs for a longer time span. The ZINB model enables us to control for this potential source 
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4.2 The explanatory variables 
The aim of the regression analysis is twofold. The main purpose is to measure the extent of the 
relationship as proxied by the number of projects that firms engage in with PROs. In addition, we 
aim to test for the existence of a relationship by analysing the propensity for firms to engage in 
collaborations with PROs and identifying some firm-specific characteristics, controlling for 
industry and country fixed effects. To achieve these aims we chose a list of covariates that 
facilitates evaluation of the effect of firm-specific factors upon the number of projects between 
firms and PROs. 
 
Following the discussion presented in Section 2 on the determinants of university–industry R&D 
cooperation and the evidence obtained from the detailed interviews we focus on four broad classes 
of firm characteristics. In particular we identified: (1) firm size; (2) firm R&D activity and status; (3) 
firm innovative activity; (4) openness of the firm. Specific questions designed to glean information 
regarding each of these classes were selected from the questionnaire  in order to construct 
independent variables. In this section we discuss the choice of these variables. Descriptive statistics 
are reported in Table 2 in the Appendix.  
 
Firm size 
The rationale underlying the role of firm size in affecting the progress of R&D collaboration is that 
big firms have more resources to help them to establish their relationships with PROs:  the smaller 
the firm, the less are the resources available to develop multiple relationships.8 We use two 
measures of firm size. First, we  consider the impact of R&D employment  (R&D). This is an 
indicator of the ‘relative’ (i.e. the research) size of the firm rather than of its overall size. As a 
measure of the absolute size of the firm we used the number of employees (EMPLOYEES). We 
would expect the absolute size to affect the propensity to collaborate more than  the extent of 
collaboration. 
 
Firm R&D activity and status 
R&D intensive firms might be more likely to set up collaborations with PROs as they are active at 
the technological frontier and thus are more reliant than other firms on scientific developments. To 
                                                                 
8 Whether a higher propensity for big firms to collaborate with PROs corresponds to a better capability to exploit the 
benefits deriving from the collaboration is controversial. Link and Rees (1990) and Acs et al. (1994) argue that big firms 
have lower R&D productivity than small firms and are therefore less efficient at exploiting the benefits deriving from 
interactions with PROs. Cohen and Klepper (1996), however, argue that the lower productivity of big firms is not related 
to R&D efficiency linked to firm size, but is instead the consequence of the presence of high fixed costs. However, we 
have to remember that the scale effect makes large firms to reap a higher profit form innovation in general.  
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test for this effect, we included a variable for R&D intensity of the firm (R&DINT), based on the 
ratio between R&D employment and total employment.  
 
The level of detail provided by the KNOW survey enables us to test if collaboration depends on 
the status of the firm. In particular, if R&D activity is concentrated in the firm headquarters this 
may affect the extent of collaboration between firms and PROs. A dummy variable (HEADQ) was 
used to account for whether the respondent was located within the central headquarters of the 
company. We expect this dummy to positively affect the development of collaborations.   
 
Firm innovative activity  
In an attempt to shed additional light on both the direction and the extent of the relationship 
between the type of innovative activity of the firm and the propensity for firms to collaborate with 
universities we decided to include in the regression two dummy variables  – one to capture 
whether the firm has introduced process innovation (PROCESS) and one focused on product 
innovation  (PRODUCT). These test for the effects of different innovative processes on the 
development of collaboration with PROs. 
 
Openness of the firm 
In defining openness, we distinguish between three types of activities:  searching,  screening and 
signalling. Laursen and Salter (2004), assume that the number of channels of information firms 
draw upon to import knowledge correspond to a search strategy. Among the 15 internal and 
external channels of information they considered are participation in fairs, conferences and 
meetings, searching databases, looking at competitors’ products, etc. Instead of using a discrete 
variable we proxy  search activity with a variable in levels  ExtCOLL, which is the mean of the 
percentage of new products and processes introduced in collaboration with external partners. We 
would expect this variable to positively affect participation in projects with PROs. 
 
Openness also refers to screening and signalling strategies. A screening strategy can be proxied by 
different ‘enablers’ in the following way. First, publications as a source of ideas seem to be a 
particularly important determinant of collaboration with PROs since reliance on them indicates the 
relevance of academic research for the innovative process. We therefore constructed a dummy 
variable  (PUBLICATIONS), which takes the value 1 when the firm  screens  information from 
scientific and business journals, and 0 when it does not. Second, participation in government-
funded R&D projects is an appropriate way to directly meet (screen) new partners, learn about 
them, their competencies and their networks. To account for this effect, we created a dummy  
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variable (SUBSIDIES), which takes the value 1 if a firm has r eceived public subsidies from 
regional, national or EU authorities for R&D activities in the three years preceding the 
questionnaire. 
 
Signalling is also proxied by two variables. The first is patents. As the outcome of a research 
process, patents are usually used to protect product innovations from imitation (Levin et al. 1987) 
increase the bargaining power of firms in negotiations (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001) and in R&D 
cooperation and knowledge exchange (Pénin, 2004). We would expect appropriation and signalling 
to affect the extent of R&D projects with PROs. More specifically, using patents to protect 
innovation and signal competencies should have positive effects on participation in collaborative 
projects with PROs. A dummy variable (PATENT) is employed to capture this effect.  
 
In addition to patenting, outsourcing R&D expenditure is another way in which firms signal their 
propensity to establish collaborative relationships. Firms with a higher propensity to establish 
R&D collaborations with independent firms may be involved in a high number of collaborations 
with PROs. One of the reasons for this is that once they have developed the skills needed to 
manage cross-boundary relationships, firms are more willing to cooperate with external partners 
in the development of an innovative activity for the firm. To capture this influence, we used 
information on the (percentage) external expenditure in independent organisations to total firm 
R&D expenditures (ExtR&D). This variable is clearly another proxy for the openness of a firm to 
the external R&D environment. Firms with high external R&D expenditures are more open to 
interaction with external organisations. We would expect  screening activities to affect the 
probability of being involved in at least one R&D collaboration (if you do not screen you do not 
want to cooperate) while signalling should influence the extent of participation in collaborative 
projects with PROs. 
 
We also included in the regressions two additional dummy variables.A dummy variable 
(COUNTRY) to account for country fixed effects and a control dummy (SECTOR) to account for 
sector-specific effects.   
 
4.3 Estimation results 
In this section we present the results from the estimation of several negative binomial models. Five 
models were estimated taking the number of R&D cooperations as the dependent variable. Model 
(1) considers the logs of relative size (R&D) absorptive capacity (R&DINT) and the dummies 
related to firm status (HEADQ) and the type of innovative activity carried out by the firm  
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(PROCESS and PRODUCT). Models (2) to (5) take account of the impact of the openness and the 
sector as well as country dummies. In these models the variables that are proxies for openness are 
added in sequence. Thus we are able to capture the impact of the searching strategy as proxied by 
ExtCOLL in model (2), to estimate the contribution of screening as proxied by PUBLICATIONS 
and SUBSIDIES in model (3) and to capture the influence of signalling as proxied by PATENT and 
EXT R&D in model (4). Table 3 below presents the results. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
In model (1), all the independent variables chosen have a positive effect on the extent to which 
firms engage in collaborations with PROs, and all the coefficients excluding PRODUCT are 
significantly different from zero. We find evidence of an ‘R&D size and activity effect’ on the 
extent to which firms engage in projects with PROs as represented by the positive coefficients for 
R&D, our proxy for relative size and absorptive capacity. This result suggests that larger firms that 
are heavily engaged in R&D activities (high R&D intensity) become involved in a higher number 
of collaborations with PROs than do small firms.9 Moreover, we find evidence of a positive 
correlation between the status of the firm and the extent of collaboration indicating that firms that 
are part of large units tend to collaborate more than independent firms. Finally, engaging in 
process innovation seems to increase the extent of involvement in R&D cooperations while, as 
mentioned above, there is no evidence of a significant correlation between product innovation and 
engagement in collaborations with PROs.  
 
Models (2) to (4) estimate the contribution of the various activities that constitute openness. Model 
(2) considers the contribution of searching  as proxied by the mean of the percentage of new 
products and process introduced in collaboration with external partners (ExtCOLL). The 
coefficient of this variable is positive, but not significant, suggesting that searching does not affect 
the number of collaborations between firms and PROs. It is interesting to note that this result 
                                                                 
9 Several attempts to include other variables in the list of independent variables were made. In particular we checked for 
the influence of firm strategy, other than looking at external collaboration in R&D expenditures, might have on the 
propensity for firms to engage in projects with PROs. For instance, to analyse the possibility that firms involved in 
strategic business alliances are more likely to participate in R&D cooperative projects with PROs, we introduced in the 
regression a dummy variable (RJV) that takes the value of 1 when the firm is involved in a business joint venture, and 0 
when it is not. While the effect of this variable on the number of R&D projects was generally positive, the coefficient of 
the variable was not significant.   
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contradicts that obtained by Laursen and Salter (2004) who found searching to be an important 
determinant of university–industry collaborations.10  
 
Models (3) and (4) relate to the two other activities that constitute openness:  screening and 
signalling respectively. Screening as proxied by looking at publications, and participation in projects 
subsidised by regional, national or EU authorities, positively affects the number of collaborations 
with PROs. Both our proxies for signalling have the expected (and positive) sign although only one 
of them (patenting) is significant. More generally, the addition of these variables does not change 
the sign of the others although the level of significance is slightly affected. These results confirm 
that  searching does not seems to affect collaboration with PROs  while the other measures of 
openness do. Thus, the usefulness of distinguishing between  searching,  screening and  signalling 
activities as constituents of openness is stressed.  
 
Finally, in model (5) we control for country and sector fixed effects. Results from this model 
generally confirm the results of models (1)-(4) although the coefficients of some variables 
(R&DINT, HEADQ) become less significant.   
 
A final comment is needed about the appropriateness of the choice of the Negative Binomial for 
the estimation of Models (1) to (5). We have stressed that overdispersion in our data seems to point 
to the inadequacy of employing the Poisson distribution for estimation. This impression was 
confirmed by the outcome the a-Likelihood Ratio tests carried out for each of the specifications, the 
values of which are displayed at the bottom of Table 3. In each case the test value of the Chi square 
suggests that the probability of the data having been generated by a Poisson process is very low. 
This led us to reject the null hypothesis and prefer a Negative Binomial.  
 
The sensitivity of these results was checked by estimating a ZINB model. Before running these 
regressions we performed a Vuong test to select between the Negative Binomial and the ZINB.11 A 
                                                                 
10 To further check this result we constructed another proxy for search following Laursen and Salter (i.e. considering the 
number of channels used by the firm to relate to the outside world). In t his case, too, there was no significant 
relationship between the extent that firms engage in R&D collaborations and searching as a proxy for openness. 
11 Define  ( ) i i X y f1  the density function of the ZINB model and  ( ) i i X y f2 the density function of the Negative 
Binomial model and let  ( ) ( ) i i i i i X y f X y f Ln m 2 1 = , the Vuong statistics for testing the hypothesis of the ZINB 














. If v >2 the ZINB model presents a better fit 
than the Negative Binomial. However, if v < -2, the Negative Binomial presents a better fit. For -2 < v < 2 . Neither model 
then can be said to be preferred (Greene, 2000, p. 891).    
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value of  v = 3.62 seems to suggest that a ZINB model provides a better fit than a Negative 
Binomial. Table 4 below reports the results. 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
The last two columns in the table separate the coefficients of the ZINB regressions (Model 6) from 
those from the Logit Selection regression (Model 7). These results were produced using the same 
covariates in both models with the exception of absolute size (EMPLOYEES) which was used in 
place of relative size (R&D), the inclusion of screening variables in the Logit Selection model only, 
and the inclusion of the signalling variables in the ZINB regression only.  
 
The results of the ZINB model are similar to the Negative Binomial. Compared to the Negative 
Binomial, in the ZINB regression HEADQ and PROCESS no longer exhibit a significant coefficient. 
In terms of the effect of the other independent variables, both signalling variables have a positive 
influence on the number of cooperative R&D activities between firms and PROs.  
 
More interesting in the context of this paper is the comparison between the coefficients in the ZINB 
regression (Model 6) and those in the Logit Selection regression (Model 7). While the former 
accounts for the influence of the independent variables on the extent to which firms engage in 
collaborations with PROs, the latter captures the influence of the variables on the propensity of 
firms to participate in a collaborative agreement.12  
 
In the Logit regression, EMPLOYEES, the proxy for the ‘absolute size’ of the firm, positively affects 
the propensity to participate. Other things being equal we can argue that there is indeed an 
‘absolute size’ effect determining the propensity for a firm to engage in collaborations with PROs, 
while there is no significant ‘relative size’ effect as captured by R&D employment, on the extent of 
participation in projects. R&D intensity, the proxy for the position of the firm with respect to the 
technological frontier rather than firm size, is a significant explanatory variable for both extent of 
and propensity for collaboration, though with a higher probability in the Logit regression. The 
HEADQ variable changes in significance between the Logit and the ZINB regression. Respondents 
located in the headquarters of a firm have a higher propensity to collaborate with PROs compared 
to other respondents, but this characteristic does not affect the level of cooperation. Finally, 
                                                                 
12 A positive coefficient in the Logit Selection regression indicates that a firm is less likely to collaborate with PROs.   
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making product innovations significantly affects the extent of collaboration while engaging in 
process and/or product innovation does not significantly affect the propensity to collaborate. 
 
Among the different types of activities explaining openness, searching is never significant while 
screening positively affect the probability of being involved in at least one R&D collaboration and 
signalling positively influences the number of times a firms signs agreements with a PRO. Other 
effects being equal, screening by consulting scientific or business journals for ideas, and possibly for 
signals of the competences of potential partners, has a positive impact on the propensity to 
collaborate with PROs. Similarly, SUBSIDIES has a positive and significant effect in the Logit 
estimation. On the other hand, outsourcing R&D activities and taking out patents, our proxy for 
signalling, positively affects the extent to which firms engage in collaborations with PROs.  
 
Our findings can be summarised as follows. The propensity of firms to collaborate with PROs is 
positively affected by their absolute size, their R&D activity and their degree of openness, but not 
by the type of innovation they generate (process or product innovation). Larger firms with a high 
absorptive capacity generally tend to cooperate with the academic world. Openness of the firm to 
the external environment affects the propensity and level of collaboration with PROs. The general 
searching activity does not influence the propensity for cooperation. Screening activities, however, 
constitute important explanatory variables of R&D cooperation. Seeking information in scientific 
and business journals (i.e. the major channel used by open science to share information and signal 
competences) and also participating in government-funded projects positively affect the 
propensity for firms to collaborate with PROs. In short, larger firms with higher learning abilities 
which engage in in-depth screening activities are the most likely partners for universities. 
Openness also positively affects the number of agreements concluded by firms through patenting, 
and the extent of R&D outsourcing. Patents may constitute a way to signal the firms' competencies, 
especially in the case of SMEs for whom secrecy is the usual way to approach appropriability and 
thus patents could be interpreted as a proxy for signalling. R&D outsourcing is itself a signal that 
firms are willing to engage in collaborations with external partners. Finally, the extent of 
involvement in cooperation with PROs is affected only by the intensity of R&D activities carried 
out by firms. In short, firms with more R&D involvement, that are more involved with external 
R&D suppliers and which signal their competences, tend to develop a larger number of 
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5. Conclusions 
The KNOW questionnaire provides a unique data set for the researcher to analyse the innovation 
processes of SMEs with a minimum of 10 and a maximum of 999 employees. This paper looked at 
the characteristics of the firms that developed R&D collaborative projects with PROs taking into 
account sector and country fixed effects. One of the main contributions of this analysis is to 
characterise firms through the activities used to manage internal and external knowledge. Firms 
that actively screen their environment and voluntarily disclose internal competencies have a 
higher propensity to collaborate with academic partners and cooperate in a more extensive way. 
 
About half of the firms surveyed had developed R&D projects with PROs. The econometric 
models developed estimate the impact of firm-specific factors, controlling for sector and country 
fixed effects, upon both the probability of developing a collaboration and the number of 
collaborations with a PRO entered into by the firm in the three years previous to the KNOW 
survey. The results of this analysis point to two main findings.  
 
The first findings focus on the role of the size and the R&D activity on the collaborative behaviour 
(propensity and intensity) of the firms. They mainly confirm the empirical findings for large firms 
((over 1000 employees). The propensity to conclude an agreement with an academic partner 
depends on the ‘absolute size’ of the industrial partner (Arundel  et al. 2000; Cohen et al. 2002; 
Mohnen and Hoareau 2003; Laursen and Salter 2004). Larger firms are much more likely to 
collaborate. We also found that the chances of firms with intense R&D activities to cooperate are 
much higher as is the likelihood of concluding agreements with PROs: firms with small absorptive 
capacities had lower probabilities on both counts (Arundel and Geuna, 2004).  
 
The second set of results concerns the openness of firms, that is, their willingness to search for 
external knowledge, to screen the outside world using publications databases and participating in 
publicly-funded programmes and also to  signal their competencies by patenting, and by 
outsourcing R&D expenditures. Our findings suggest that acquiring knowledge through the 
screening of publications and involvement in public policies affect the probability of signing an 
agreement with a PRO, but not the level of collaboration developed. Instead, firms that outsource 
R&D expenditure and patent to protect innovation and to signal competencies show higher levels 
of collaboration. These results somehow imply that the existence of a screening strategy would 
determine the start of a relationship between firms and PROs; whereas the activation of a signalling 
strategy would explain the intensity of the interaction, other things being equal. In other words, 
the firms that actively observe and monitor outside knowledge (especially through  screening  
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publications, i.e. the channels of open science) tend to develop R&D cooperation with PROs; 
however, the level of interaction (as measured by the number of R&D projects) depends on the 
willingness to signal their competences and the relative weight of network interactions in their 
production of knowledge. 
 
The results of our analysis support the view that relationships between firms and PROs are 
characterised by  a high degree of heterogeneity. To generalise about university–industry 
relationships, and develop policies on the basis of such generalisations will lead to unintended 
inter-sectoral differences. The various actors will react to these policies in different ways 
depending on their specific characteristics. Furthermore, it is extremely important to take into 
account that policies in support of collaboration between PROs and firms should create incentives 
for both sets of actors to cooperate. Current policies are mainly directed to creating incentives for 
PROs to interact with firms, with no acknowledgement that without an appropriate ‘demand’ little 
will be achieved. This paper provides strong evidence that, after controlling for firm size and other 
factors, the openness of firms to the external environment (and therefore their willingness to 
interact with it in different ways) is very important in explaining their patterns of collaboration 
with PROs.  
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Table 1: Share of respondents for PROs contract classes  
Contract 
Classes 
Food  Chemicals  Comm Eq  Telecomm Serv  Comp Serv 
0  44.7%  44.5%  52.3%  75.6%  56.1% 
1  43.0%  37.3%  30.2%  22.0%  28.0% 
2  7.9%  16.4%  15.2%  0%  7.5% 
3  4.4%  1.8%  2.4%  2.4%  8.4% 
0 = zero contracts; 1 = 1 contract; 2 = 2 contracts; 3 = more than 2 contracts  
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Table 3: Regression Summary – Negative Binomial regressions  
(Dependent Variable: Number of R&D collaborations) 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
























































































(.29)  SCREENING 
SUBSIDIES 
(dummy) 

















  SECTOR 
(dummy) 
        YES 
  COUNTRY 
(dummy) 
        YES 
Log-likelihood    -643.11  -550.91  -506.74  -434.52  -418.41 
LR Chisq    67.95**  58.81**  70.20**  67.51**  99.73** 
Pseudo Rsq    .050  .050  .065  .072  .106 
No Obs    395  336  304  255  255 
LR Chisq a = 0    370.20**  324.04**  268.09**  216.70**  163.34** 
*indicates significant at 10% confidence interval. 
** indicates significant at least at 5% confidence interval. 
Standard errors between brackets  
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Table 4: Regression Summary – ZINB and Logit Selection Equation 
    ZINB 
    (6)  (7) 
      LOGIT 
SELECTION 




RELATIVE SIZE  LN(R&D)  .15** 
(.07) 
 














































EXT R&D  .01** 
(.00) 
 
  SECTOR 
(dummy) 
YES 
  COUNTRY 
(dummy) 
YES 
Log-likelihood    -369.92 
LR Chisq    60.90** 
No Obs    255 
*indicates significant at 10% confidence interval. 
** indicates significant at least at 5% confidence interval. 
Standard errors between brackets 
 
  




Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for selected variables (all variables) 
Variable 
 
Obs  Mean  Std. Dev  Min  Max 
No of Collaborations 
 
458  1.62  2.84  0  25 
R&D 
 
491  13.53  32.52  0  300 
R&DINT 
 
485  0.15  0.23  0  1 
EMPLOYEES 
 
546  194.82  261.52  2  1200 
HEADQ 
(dummy) 
554      0:241  1:313 
PROCESS 
(dummy) 
543      0:95  1:448 
PRODUCT 
(dummy) 
553      0:22  1:531 
ExtCOLL 
 
483  14.93  18.93  0  100 
PUBLICATIONS 
(dummy) 
552      0:99  1:453 
SUBSIDIES 
(dummy) 
492      0:341  1:151 
PATENTS 
(dummy) 
551      0:354  1:197 
ExtR&D 
 
417  14.32  22.44  0  100 
For dummy variables, the last two columns report the number of cases in which the variables take the value 
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